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Myanmar: End-Term Outcome Measurement Report

2025



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Executive Summary

The end-term outcome measurements for the Myanmar Power of Dialogue (PoD) programme provide a cumulative picture of progress over the 2021–2025 period against the country Theory of Change and actor-based pathways. The measurements combine quantitative indicator data with outcome harvesting and qualitative reflections to assess how far the programme has contributed to strengthening democratic actors, inclusive political participation, and dialogue at subnational level in an extremely volatile context.

Data collection for this report took place between June and October 2025. It was led by the NIMD Myanmar M&E focal point, with validation by the programme manager and country director, and with inputs from alumni and dialogue members through online surveys, end-results assessments, and follow-up interviews. The measurements build on baseline and mid-term assessments and make use of participant lists, desk review of reports and planning documents, and outcome harvesting sessions with programme staff and key actors.

For LTO1, the consortium, partner networks and local CSOs have become more effective enablers of change. One joint proposal aimed at strengthening democratic space were formulated and used for lobbying and advocacy at international level over the programme period, compared to none at baseline. The joint proposal prepared with an Assistant Professor from Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam for the IPA Peace and Recovery Call, focusing on enabling women and youth to lead inclusive dialogue and peacebuilding processes in Karenni, Kayin and Shan States. Seven external CSOs were brought into PoD-related trajectories, Six staff members from consortium and partners were trained, and 52 civic and political actors were trained in dialogue and mediation. These values show that, despite restrictions on civic space, these results indicate that NIMD Myanmar and the partner networks are increasingly functioning as complementary enablers of change, supporting civic and political actors to coordinate initiatives, engage in dialogue around shared policy agendas, and contribute to safeguarding civic space despite ongoing political and operational constraints.

For LTO2, young, women and ethnic leaders have become substantially more influential political actors. The percentage of women and youth involved in politics who feel able to participate in decision-making processes rose from an estimated 40 percent at baseline (based on legacy programme data) to 71 percent at mid-term and 71 percent at end-term (39 out of 55 respondents). This suggests steady growth of confidence and perceived legitimacy among these actors in contributing to political discussions and decision-making spaces. Capacity development efforts also contributed to this shift: 94 representatives of political actors participated in democracy-oriented training, 106 women and youth leaders were trained, and alumni engaged in at least 37 multi-stakeholder dialogue spaces at subnational level, where they applied these skills by voicing perspectives, facilitating discussions, and advocating for more inclusive political processes. These developments indicate that young and women leaders are increasingly moving beyond participation toward more active roles in shaping dialogue and political discussions within their networks and communities. At the same time, the 2025 political context became more polarized in the lead-up to the announced 2025 elections, which required constant attention to risk, impartiality, and ground rules in PoD spaces, the programme continued to provide safe and trusted platforms that enabled these actors to maintain engagement and advocacy. Taken together, these results reflect meaningful progress along the LTO2 pathway, as youth, women, and ethnic leaders increasingly use their knowledge, networks, and confidence to voicing, monitoring, advocating, and contributing to more inclusive political processes at the subnational level in Shan, Kayin, Kayah, and Mon States.

For LTO3, democratic political actors at subnational level have made significant progress in building trust and practising dialogue, even if formal, inclusive dialogue remains highly constrained. 72 civic and political actors were trained in dialogue and mediation, strengthening their ability to engage constructively across political and institutional divides. 31 multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings were organized at subnational level, where actors from different political and organization backgrounds were able to exchange perspectives, discuss grievances, and explore possible solutions through structured dialogue processes. 81 agreements were reached on reform agendas, policies, or legal amendments related to dialogue processes and constitutional development in Kayin State. Outcome harvesting data confirm that Kayin dialogue members have developed shared peace-progress indicators, jointly identified priority grievances, and co-designed action plans, even while implementation is hampered by conflict and security risks. While implementation of some initiatives remains constrained by ongoing conflict and security risks, these developments demonstrate that democratic political actors increasingly recognize the value of dialogue and are applying it as a practical tool to address grievances at the subnational



level. Taken together, these results reflect substantive progress along the LTO3 pathway, as actors gradually build trust, institutionalise dialogue practices, and engage each other to address the grievances at the subnational level despite a highly restricted environment.

1. Methodology

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Data collection for the end-term outcome measurement was carried out between June and October 2025. It covered the full programme period (2021–2025) and built on the baseline (2021) and mid-term (2023) measurements. The process was coordinated by the NIMD Myanmar POD programme team, in close collaboration with the programme coordinator and country director, who jointly validated the data and interpretations.

The team used a mix of methods:

- Targeted surveys and end-results assessments with democracy school alumni and political actors to measure perception-based indicators such as the percentage of women and youth who feel able to participate in decision-making processes. Questionnaires were translated, administered online, and complemented by phone follow-ups where safe and feasible.
- Desk review of participant lists, agendas, activity reports, annual and mid-year reports, and planning documents to determine cumulative numbers of people trained, CSOs involved, and dialogue meetings held.
- Outcome harvesting to document key behavioural changes among alumni, political actors, and dialogue members, drawing on meeting notes, recommendations, and testimonies. This was especially important for outcome indicators related to trust, dialogue practices, and the use of advocacy proposals.
- Key-informant discussions with staff, selected dialogue members from Kayin State Dialogue Platform and IEC, Karenni State as well as selected alumni from the MyDemocracy School network who are engaged in political or civic initiatives at the subnational level. These individuals represent a mix of democratic actors, politicians, political party members, youth and women leaders, and practitioners involved in dialogue, democracy education, governance, or peace-related processes. Due to the sensitive political and security context, discussions were conducted with individuals who were able to safely participate and share reflections on programme outcomes. The purpose of these consultations was to validate preliminary findings, clarify contextual developments, and provide qualitative insights.

The main limitations were linked to the security situation and shrinking civic space. After the coup and throughout the conflict escalation in 2022–2025, direct access to many actors was limited, travel was often unsafe, and some activities had to be held online or relocated outside Myanmar. This affected the ability to reach a fully representative sample and required reliance on trusted networks and remote tools. There is therefore an inherent bias towards actors who could remain engaged and reachable.

Compared to the baseline, the end-term measurements benefited from a more clearly defined target group (democracy school alumni and dialogue platforms), a more complete alumni database, and more systematic use of participant lists. Compared to mid-term, the end-term survey instruments were refined (e.g. clearer definitions of “involved in politics” and “participation in decision-making”), and triangulation with outcome harvesting was strengthened. These improvements increased the reliability of end-term values but also mean that comparisons with baseline, which relied partly on legacy programme data and informed estimates, should be interpreted with caution.

Despite these constraints, the combination of methods provides a sufficiently robust picture of trends over time: rising levels of participation and confidence among young, women and ethnic leaders; greater use of dialogue at subnational level; and gradual consolidation of consortium capacity and international advocacy.



2. Outcome Measurements

2.1 LTO1

2.1.1 Outcome Indicator 1

<i>The Consortium, partner networks and local CSOs are effective enablers of change</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
<i>Outcome Harvesting</i>	NA	NA	NA	NA

2.1.2 Outcome Indicator 2

<i>The Consortium, partner networks and local CSOs are effective enablers of change</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
<i># of proposals aimed at strengthening democratic space (jointly) formulated and used for L&A (at international level)</i>	0	0	1	0

For this indicator, “proposals aimed at strengthening democratic space” are understood as written, jointly formulated analyses or recommendations presented to international actors (e.g. embassies, international organisations, or transnational networks) that advocate for more inclusive, democratic processes in Myanmar. “Jointly formulated” refers to documents developed collaboratively by consortium staff, partners, and/or alumni networks, rather than unilateral statements.

Differences in definitions and data collection were primarily shaped by the political context. At baseline and midterm, no proposals were produced because the programme was still recovering from post-coup disruptions, and political actors faced significant security risks that made international advocacy difficult. By 2024–2025, as the programme stabilised operationally and generated substantial evidence from subnational dialogues, Democracy School engagement and political analysis, the team was able to co-develop multiple proposals drawing on this evidence.

The end-term value reflects meaningful external engagement at a time when domestic civic space had nearly collapsed. With increased surveillance, reporting requirements under the UEC, and the polarisation surrounding the 2025 election, political actors could not safely engage publicly inside Myanmar. International advocacy became essential. One key example was the joint proposal prepared with an Assistant Professor from Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam for the IPA Peace and Recovery Call, focusing on enabling women and youth to lead inclusive dialogue and peacebuilding processes in Karenni, Kayin and Shan States. This proposal demonstrates how PoD-supported evidence fed into international programming discussions and how subnational actors’ experiences influenced global understanding of Myanmar’s political dynamics.

At baseline and midterm, the programme was still operating under severe instability caused by the post-coup environment, relocation, and tightening surveillance of political actors. Focus during those periods remained on re-establishing safe operations, alumni networks, and dialogue mechanisms. As a result, there were no joint proposals produced in the early years.



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By 2024–2025, the programme had regained analytical and operational capacity, strengthened relationships with external experts, and generated substantive evidence from alumni engagement and subnational dialogue processes.

The production and use of this proposal illustrate how PoD Myanmar contributed to shaping international understanding of Myanmar’s political crisis when national institutions became inaccessible. The proposals relied on locally generated evidence—dialogue outcomes, alumni testimonies, and federalism brief insights—highlighting the Consortium’s enabling role.

Opportunities to engage openly with CSOs remained limited, thus reflected in the target of 0 for the end-term.

The end-term value meets expectations, particularly given the operational difficulties and political fragmentation. Despite this, the actual value reflects NIMD Myanmar’s efforts to develop a joint proposal prepared with an Assistant Professor from Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam for the IPA Peace and Recovery Call, focusing on enabling women and youth to lead inclusive dialogue and peacebuilding processes in Karenni, Kayin and Shan States.

2.1.3 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 1

<i>The PoD Consortium works complementary</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
<i># of CSOs included in the PoD programme (other led)</i>	0	0	7	3

This indicator counts CSOs that were not formal PoD implementing partners but that contributed meaningfully to PoD-supported processes. This includes providing thematic inputs, participating in consultations, supporting alumni, or contributing to policy briefs.

CSOs were identified through participation lists, activity reports, and outcome harvesting entries.

At baseline and midterm, no CSOs were counted because the programme was still rebuilding operational capacity after relocation, and civic actors within Myanmar were facing heightened risk and legal restrictions. By the end-term, three CSOs—ISP (Institute of Strategies for Peace), YSPS (Yangon School of Political Science) and MDP (Myanmar Development Professional) —were included based on their contributions to political brief consultations, expert input and support for alumni. These organisations were selected because they had established credibility, local legitimacy and the capacity to contribute safely within the restrictive political environment.

In 2024, 6 CSO/INGOs were included in the POD programme as thematic experts, technical resource person on political knowledge sharing and resource sharing.

- 1) GEN (Gender Equality Network)
- 2) ISP (Institute of Strategies for Peace)
- 3) YSPS (Yangon School of Political Science)
- 4) Tampadipa Institute
- 5) Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University
- 6) International Development Research Center (IDRC)

Three CSOs—ISP, YSPS, and MDP (Myanmar Development Professional) —were also included in 2025. Their engagement strengthened the analytical accuracy and political relevance of PoD outputs. Collaborations were particularly important in 2025 due to:

- reduced legitimacy of national political institutions,



- limited participation of dissolved political parties,
- and the increasing reliance on informal and subnational governance structures.

After removing the duplicated organizations, a total of 7 CSO/INGOs were included in the POD programme as thematic experts, technical resource person on political knowledge sharing and resource sharing through five years.

These CSOs contributed expert insights to the Bottom-Up Federalism policy brief and supported alumni consultations, helping compensate for the absence of formal civic space within Myanmar.

The shift from zero to Seven CSOs reflects a gradual and risk-aware expansion of engagement as conditions permitted. Early years focused on stabilising operations, while end-term engagement was possible due to trust built over time.

The end-term value should be interpreted through the lens of the 2025 political context. Since mid-2023, civic space has narrowed sharply due to the SAC's restructuring of political institutions, surveillance of civil society activities and restrictions associated with the planned 2025 election. Supporting even three additional CSOs under these conditions required significant trust-building and careful security assessment. Their involvement strengthened the accuracy of PoD's political briefs—especially the Bottom-Up Federalism paper—and contributed to more grounded programme interventions.

As NIMD Myanmar continued to establish a regional presence in Thailand, there were more opportunities to engage like-minded CSOs more through POD activities. The target for the end-term was adjusted based on this development.

The slight difference between the target and actual value reflects contextual and operational constraints rather than a lack of engagement or outreach. While additional CSOs participated intermittently in PoD-related activities, only those that demonstrated sustained and meaningful contributions such as providing thematic inputs, supporting alumni engagement, participating in consultations, or contributing to policy-oriented outputs were counted.

In several cases, CSOs engaged on an ad hoc or exploratory basis but did not progress to a level of contribution that met the agreed indicator criteria by the end of the reporting period. Given the volatile political environment, security constraints, and limited civic space, the inclusion of nine CSOs represents near-complete achievement of the target and demonstrates strong complementary engagement beyond formal consortium partners.

2.1.4 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 2

<i>The PoD Consortium works complementary</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of civic/political actors trained in dialogue/mediation	0	3	61	20

A trained civic or political actor is defined as an individual affiliated with a political party, ethnic organisation, interim authority or community-based governance structure who completed PoD-supported training and 4 NIMD Myanmar team members in dialogue, mediation or conflict resolution.

Data were extracted from consolidated participant lists from dialogue-facilitation training, mediation coaching and conflict resolution workshops. Duplicate names were removed. Those are from 18 participants from KSDM, 25 participants from IEC, Karenni State, 5 NIMD Myanmar team members and 4 participants from the dialogue facilitation training, as the remaining participants are already counted under KSDM and IEC.

Therefore, after removing the Duplicate participants, total 61 participants were trained in dialogue/mediation over the five years.



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The baseline data collection process for this outcome indicator was carried out in the wake of the coup. During this time, there was little to no access to relevant data, staff members, or other key informants in Myanmar who could participate in the data collection process. Therefore, the data stemmed from internal review of existing programme and planning documents and are informed estimates which considered the volatility of the political landscape at the time and the lack of access to participants from previous activities. The mid-term and end-term data collection process took place in a relatively more stable context for NIMD Myanmar, as operations for Myanmar have resumed from Thailand and the team had access to timely data for this indicator.

The high end-term value is striking given the constraints of 2025: travel reporting to the UEC, conflict escalation in Kayin and Karenni, and severely constrained civic space. Many participants traveled from contested zones or engaged from cross-border safe areas. Their new skills were applied in constitutional consultations, grievance management and internal conflict resolution within interim authorities.

The jump from 0 to 61 reflects the programme's increasing capacity to conduct safe, high-quality training despite deteriorating security conditions.

This demonstrates strong achievement of LTO1 by contributing to a cohort of trained facilitators and mediators who support inclusive political processes in areas where formal governance structures are fragmented.

Regardless of ongoing civil war happening in Myanmar, NIMD Myanmar sought to strengthen the role of the PoD Consortium, local partner CSOs, and dialogue facilitators as effective enablers of change, ultimately contributing to a more inclusive and responsive governance framework in Myanmar.

The programme exceeded the target.

Conclusion

Despite operating in an extremely restrictive political environment, the programme achieved notable progress under LTO1. NIMD Myanmar strengthened its role as effective enablers of change by expanding collaboration with seven CSOs, producing one internationally oriented proposal on inclusive dialogue and peacebuilding, and training 48 civic and political actors in dialogue and mediation. These achievements demonstrate NIMD Myanmar's growing capacity to support inclusive dialogue processes even as civic space inside Myanmar continued to shrink. While opportunities for open engagement and joint proposals remained limited due to security and political constraints, the programme successfully built a network of trained actors and partnerships that contribute to sustaining dialogue and democratic engagement at the subnational level.

2.2 LTO2

2.2.1 Outcome Indicator 3

<i>Young, Women and ethnic leaders are politically influential actors of change by voicing, monitoring and advocating for inclusive political agendas at the subnational level</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
% of women and youth involved in politics who feel they are able to participate in decision-making processes	40%	71%	71% (16 youth (29%) and 23 women)	40%



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			(42%) Out of 55 total respondents)	
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For this indicator, “women and youth involved in politics” refers to alumni who actively participate in political parties, ethnic organisations, subnational governance bodies, electoral processes or community-based political structures. “Able to participate in decision-making processes” is defined as their self-assessment that they can meaningfully contribute ideas, influence decisions, or shape discussions in their respective political or community institutions. Participation includes formal roles (e.g., committee membership) and informal influence (e.g., facilitation, advising, mediating or agenda-setting).

The end-term values were gathered through an **end-results assessment form** administered to alumni involved in MyDemocracy School (MDS) activities, democracy schools, learning seminars and dialogue platforms. The tool combined quantitative questions with qualitative reflections on political participation and decision-making influence. The sample included 55 respondents: youth, women and ethnic leaders engaged in PoD activities between 2021–2025.

Baseline values were derived from legacy programme data prior to the 2021 coup and represented a broad estimate rather than a structured survey. Mid-term data collection used an early version of the end-results assessment but the sample was smaller due to mobility restrictions and lower alumni reach. By end-term, definitions were clarified, the assessment tool was expanded, and the alumni network had strengthened, enabling more comprehensive and consistent measurement. The political context also shifted dramatically; by 2024–2025, increased surveillance, UEC reporting requirements and shrinking civic space meant the survey had to be conducted remotely and through trusted channels.

The end-term result of **71%** (29% youth and 42% women) reflects the growing confidence and political agency of women and youth, despite an extremely restrictive environment marked by the SAC’s dissolution, the takeover by the NDSC and conflict escalation. Many alumni operated in contested areas, under interim administrations or within underground political networks. The high percentage reflects strengthened skills and knowledge, improved communication and mediation abilities and increased trust from their organisations. Alumni—particularly women—reported actively shaping discussions, mediating disputes, informing decision-makers based on community needs and providing feedback rooted in their on-the-ground experience.

Their influence was not in national formal institutions—which remain inaccessible—but in the **bottom-up federal structures emerging in areas outside military control**, where leadership is urgently needed and more accessible to younger and women actors.

The progression from 40% to 71% to 71% shows steady growth in alumni confidence, political literacy and leadership roles. This shift is linked to the programme’s expanded capacity-building efforts, the functioning of the dialogue platforms and increased demand for youth and women leaders within interim and community-based governance structures in Kayin, Karenni, Shan and Mon.

The outcome reflects a dynamic process where increased skills, supportive environments, inclusive practices, and personal initiative have strengthened participation in decision-making across various political and community spaces, while systemic and structural barriers continue to limit full and equal involvement for many.

Participation varied across contexts. Some alumni described having influence within their party’s executive committee while only being partially involved in decision-making at the state level. Others noted that understanding institutional processes made participation easier, while limited access to information or restrictive organizational mandates reduced their influence.

Alumni particularly women and youth gaining substantial political knowledge and leadership skills through capacity building training and events organized by NIMD Myanmar. This enhanced capacity enabled them to articulate their perspectives clearly, engage in policy discussions, and provide well-informed advice during



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decision-making. Several participants were invited into leadership or decision-making spaces specifically because of their demonstrated competence, communication skills, and trusted relationships with diverse groups.

Many women described actively contributing to discussions, mediating between groups, facilitating dialogue when disagreements emerged, and offering corrective feedback based on their on-the-ground experience with communities. Expanded opportunities for women—such as increased allocation of roles—also strengthened their participation.

At the time of the baseline, there had not been a specific target values allocated for this outcome due to the uncertainty of the political situation in Myanmar. Adjustments for intermediate indicators were deliberated further in the annual planning discussions for 2024 and 2025, and targets were adjusted accordingly as NIMD Myanmar was able to hold more capacity building activities to empower women and youth.

The actual value exceeded the target.

2.2.2 Outcome Indicator 4

<i>Young, Women and ethnic leaders are politically influential actors of change by voicing, monitoring and advocating for inclusive political processes at the subnational level</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
Outcome Harvesting	<i>Youth, women, Ethnic political leaders are motivated to participate and are interested in engaging with online resources</i>	<i>Youth and women have strengthened capacity to voice, monitor and advocate for democratic values and principles within their networks</i>	<i>Young, Women leaders are politically influential actors of change by voicing, monitoring and advocating for inclusive political processes at the subnational level (Shan, Kayin, Kayah, Mon)</i>	<i>Young, Women leaders are politically influential actors of change by voicing, monitoring and advocating for inclusive political processes at the subnational level (Shan, Kayin, Kayah, Mon)</i>

This indicator captures behavioural changes demonstrating that young, women and ethnic leaders are influencing political processes by voicing community needs, monitoring governance, advocating for inclusive agendas and participating in subnational decision-making. An “inclusive political process” is defined as one where diverse political actors—women, youth, ethnic representatives, civil society and community stakeholders—meaningfully participate in shaping decisions, policies or governance outcomes.

This indicator was measured through outcome harvesting using data from Outlook surveys, alumni interviews, learning seminar documentation, dialogue outputs and reports from subnational governance processes. A total of 55 alumni responded to the Outlook survey, providing evidence on participation, advocacy actions and leadership roles.



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Baseline statements were aspirational rather than measurable. Mid-term harvesting focused on skill acquisition and early political engagement. By end-term, the definitions expanded to include concrete examples of influence such as leading community mobilisation, participating in constitutional drafting groups, mediating disputes and coordinating humanitarian responses. End-term measurement also incorporated richer qualitative evidence from Kayin and Karenni dialogue platforms and extensive alumni contributions.

By end-term, young women and ethnic leaders demonstrated political influence in structurally challenging environments. They led voter education initiatives, facilitated inclusive dialogue and engaged in candidate selection within parties. Their advocacy extended to crisis response—mobilising humanitarian aid for over **50,000 people from conflict and disasters**, documenting human rights violations, and participating in local environmental governance debates. Through the establishment of networks such as the Human Rights Educator Network (HREN), they amplified community voices across conflict-affected states and mediated between authorities, armed actors and communities. In the context of heightened insecurity and political turmoil, these actions demonstrate significant resilience and political agency.

Baseline showed motivation but limited opportunities. Mid-term reflected growing competencies. End-term outcomes demonstrated concrete political influence at state and community levels, expanding well beyond skill development into sustained political participation and leadership.

The shift indicates strong achievement of LTO2: PoD not only strengthened the capacity of emerging political actors but supported them as they applied their skills to shape local governance processes during an unprecedented political crisis.

Youth, women, and ethnic leaders continued to be at the forefront of pro-democracy initiatives on a national and subnational level. Their leadership can be observed in both the political arena—in positions within the duly elected shadow government bodies and local governance. Although this points to their potential and motivation to be politically influential actors of change, it also puts them at greater risk of persecution and insecurity as the junta increasingly targets democratic activists, who have been forced to go on the run after building a significant online presence or gaining media attention through their active involvement in pro-democracy initiatives. Additionally, the concrete agendas which women, youth, and ethnic political leaders were setting and advocating for within their parties or networks at the subnational level had been upended as a result of the coup's crippling effects on Myanmar's traditional political institutions.

Consequently, NIMD Myanmar reframed LTO 2's long term objective in the annual plan for 2023 to better fit this changed context.

The actual value is equal to the target.

2.2.3 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 3

<i>Young, women and ethnic leaders strengthen their political platforms by increased capacity to voice, monitor and advocate public's interest</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of representatives (male/female) of political actors have participated in democratic values oriented training activities (e.g. democracy schools)	0	73	145	20

This indicator counts political party representatives, ethnic organisation members, interim governance officials and community-based political actors who participated in PoD's democracy-oriented training, including



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Democracy Schools training, MDS advance training, Democracy School ToT, learning seminars and values-based workshops.

Attendance lists and online MDS enrolment records were consolidated, and duplicate names were removed.

The baseline data collection process for this outcome indicator was carried out in the wake of the coup. During this time, target groups for training had not been specified yet. Therefore, the data stemmed from internal review of past programme and planning documents and are informed estimates which considered the volatility of the political landscape at the time and the lack of access to participants from previous activities. The mid-term data collection process took place in a relatively more stable and timely manner for NIMD Myanmar in 2023, as target groups had been specified and democracy school trainings had resumed since 2022. By end-term, improved alumni systems and systematic use and uptake of online surveys enabled more accurate and comprehensive data collection.

The end-term value reflects high demand for democracy education in a context where the national political landscape is severely polarised, and civic space is restricted. Political actors from Kayin, Karenni, Mon and Shan turned to PoD's safe, cross-border learning spaces as some of the only venues where democratic principles could be learned and discussed without surveillance.

The baseline value represents the uncertainty of the political situation at the time of data collection in 2021 in the wake of the coup. A key precondition for the pathway had to be met—this is, that target groups would still have the motivation and be able to attend activities related to democracy and politics in the first place after the events that transpired when the junta took power. The midterm value signifies that not only was this precondition met amongst the networks that NIMD Myanmar has previously worked with, but amongst the general public as well, as the open call which was posted on Facebook garnered over 80 applications expressing interest in political knowledge and democracy education programmes. The growth to 145 participants in the end-term signals both operational improvements and sustained demand for democracy education trainings from political actors who need it most— who are also facing restricted access to information, surveillance and deepening political fragmentation.

The programme surpassed expectations in equipping political actors with democratic values skills, which in turn enhanced their ability to advocate for inclusive processes in subnational settings (*See outcome harvesting annex*).

Targets were not adjusted. The actual value exceeded the target.

2.2.4 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 4

<i>Young, women and ethnic leaders strengthen their political platforms by increased capacity to voice, monitor and advocate public's interest</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of women/youth leaders trained	0	47	106 (57 youth and 49 women)	30



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This indicator is defined as the number of women and youth leaders of different movements, organizations and institutions, both civic and political, that participate in capacity development activities, including Democracy Schools, MDS advance training, Democracy School ToT, learning seminars and values-based workshops.

Measured through participant attendance sheets across all Democracy School training activities and duplicate names were removed.

The baseline data collection process for this outcome indicator was carried out in the wake of the coup. During this time, target groups for training had not been specified yet. Therefore, the data stemmed from internal review of past programme and planning documents and are informed estimates which considered the volatility of the political landscape at the time and the lack of access to participants from previous activities. Midterm and end-term data was collected using standardised attendance sheets.

The baseline value represents the uncertainty of the political situation at the time of data collection in 2021, in the immediate aftermath of the coup. Youth and women were at the forefront of the pro-democracy movement, despite being historically marginalised and underrepresented, and it was unclear whether they would retain the motivation or feel safe enough to participate in democracy-related activities following the trauma, violence, and repression that accompanied the junta's takeover. The midterm value shows that, despite these safety and security concerns, youth and women—both within NIMD Myanmar's existing networks and among the wider public—remained eager to access political knowledge and participate in democracy education programmes. Participants continued to join online sessions and travelled to Thailand for week-long in-person trainings, demonstrating sustained commitment to democratic values even as civic space inside Myanmar continued to shrink.

The end-term value further demonstrates that this commitment translated into tangible political influence and leadership. By 2025, youth and women not only continued to participate in PoD activities but increasingly applied their knowledge within political parties, interim governance structures, ethnic administrations, and community-level initiatives—showing that early motivation had evolved into sustained political agency despite worsening conflict and heightened restrictions. As the impact evidence, one MDS alumni from the Ta'ang Self-Administered Zone, who is a founder of the Tea Land Education Foundation, uses the MDS App as a learning tool to deliver courses on the constitution, good governance, and democracy to **34–35 students over one week**. In total, he has conducted three batches of training up to July 2025 (*Outcome #019, 2025 OH Report*). In addition, according to follow-up interview, one alumna from SNLD party, she is a CEC member and she was able to advocate to have the women's wings in her party and she achieved the agreement in March, 2025 in her party. There are 5 committee members and she is one of them leading the women's wing (*Outcome #023, 2025 OH report*).

The difference in value indicates that, even as Myanmar's political environment remained highly unstable, youth and women continued to participate actively in democracy education activities. Their steady engagement across online sessions, in-person trainings in Thailand, and follow-up learning seminars demonstrates that these groups were able to access and complete structured political learning opportunities despite escalating conflict, mobility restrictions, and surveillance. Participation in 2023 trainings provided them with concrete skills and knowledge—such as democratic principles, advocacy techniques, public-interest analysis, and communication tools—that are foundational for strengthening their political platforms.

By the end-term, the continued increase in trained youth and women reflected the programme's expanded reach rather than assumptions about individual confidence. The higher end-term value shows that more young and women leaders successfully entered PoD's learning pipeline, gained exposure to democratic concepts, and acquired the technical competencies needed to contribute to political discussions, public-interest monitoring, and civic engagement within their respective networks.

The difference in value shows clear progress toward this outcome because it demonstrates that the programme was able to sustain and expand access to democratic-values training for youth and women despite a rapidly deteriorating political environment. As participation increased over the reporting period, more emerging leaders gained exposure to foundational democratic concepts, public-interest analysis, and skills relevant to political engagement. This expansion of the training cohort aligns directly with the programme's objective of



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strengthening the capacity base from which young, women and ethnic leaders can develop their political platforms.

The rising numbers indicate that the programme successfully reached a broader and more diverse group of political actors, embedded them in structured learning processes, and equipped them with the basic knowledge required for future advocacy, monitoring and participation in inclusive political processes. The increase therefore reflects meaningful progress in building the critical mass of trained individuals needed to support longer-term democratic engagement at the subnational level. In 2025, a woman political actor from Shan State engaged directly with the Union Election Commission to advocate for reducing candidate security deposits in elections, arguing that the existing requirements create barriers for women entering politics. Her advocacy aimed to create more equitable conditions for women candidates and expand women's participation in electoral processes (*Outcome #029, 2025 OH report*). In addition, the 2025 alumni end-term survey shows that, 26 programme alumni—including youth and women leaders—from Kayin, Shan, Mon, Karenni, Tanintharyi, and Yangon actively disseminated democracy education within their communities, reaching 2,551 participants. These community sessions focused on democratic governance, federalism, citizen participation, and inclusive political processes. By transferring knowledge to local leaders, youth, and women, these alumni expanded civic awareness and strengthened grassroots capacity to engage in democratic dialogue and participation at the subnational level (*Outcome #017, 2025 OH report*).

The initial target values were set during a time of extreme political uncertainty and a lack of access to key stakeholders due to the security risks involved with outreach. Therefore, targets were revisited as activities continued to be implemented and actors showed increased willingness to engage with NIMD Myanmar's democracy education activities.

A key development during this period was the rollout of the MyDemocracy School (MDS) mobile application in 2025, designed as a complementary digital platform to support alumni, expand access to democratic knowledge and reach individuals unable to attend in-person sessions due to conflict, displacement or travel restrictions. The end-term target of 1,000 users was exceeded significantly, with the app reaching more than 1,500 users, demonstrating both the relevance of digital learning tools in a restricted environment and the unexpectedly high demand for accessible democracy education.

This uptake illustrates that, despite structural barriers and insecurity, the programme successfully broadened its learning ecosystem and expanded its pool of trained individuals beyond in-person formats. The increase in participants—and the overachievement of the MDS end-term target—therefore reflects tangible progress in strengthening the foundations for youth, women and ethnic leaders to develop their political knowledge and engage more effectively in inclusive political processes over time.

The actual value exceeded the target.

2.2.5 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 5

<i>Young, women and ethnic leaders strengthen their political platforms by increased capacity to voice, monitor and advocate public's interest</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of preparation activities to create/consolidate operational space for the consortium partner/partner/country office	0	88	125	0

This indicator counts the preparatory and engagement activities required to secure operational and financial continuity for NIMD–Myanmar. This includes all steps taken to obtain a functioning and compliant bank account—such as completing documentation, verification, activation, and financial controls—as well as all actions undertaken to initiate and advance funding discussions with Demo Finland, including formal



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communication, meetings, and sharing program information necessary to explore potential financial support for 2026.

The NIMD Myanmar team conducted a desk review of relevant documents including the event management checklist which lists the number of unique preparation activities undertaken for each event. The data was discussed and validated together with the programme manager, country director, and wider NIMD Myanmar team.

At baseline, NIMD Myanmar was still determining how to continue working with target groups from outside the country, following the coup and the collapse of safe in-country operations. The organisation restructured to function fully online until in-person activities could resume safely. By mid-term, NIMD Myanmar had established a stable cross-border operating model from Thailand, delivering both online and in-person activities under the PoD programme and introducing key policies—such as a procurement policy and event management checklist—to strengthen efficiency and financial accountability.

By end-term, these systems had matured, and NIMD Myanmar had fully normalised its cross-border operations.

During the end-term period, NIMD Myanmar completed two major preparation activities essential for sustaining its operational space. The organisation successfully secured a functioning and compliant bank account in Thailand, ensuring financial continuity and the ability to manage programme funds safely. In parallel, the team engaged in discussions with Demo Finland to explore potential funding support for 2026, an important step toward maintaining NIMD–Myanmar’s country mission amid limited flexible funding.

By end-term, operational systems had stabilised further, and the team was able to deliver complex activities, coordinate multiple training cycles, and maintain programme continuity even as conflict intensified and civic space closed further. However, plans to formally register the organisation in Thailand could not proceed in 2025 due to recent changes in Thai government regulations and the high costs associated with registration, leading the team to continue operating under existing cross-border arrangements.

Despite not being able to formally register in Thailand, by end-term, the ability to consistently complete key preparatory steps, maintain compliance, and plan complex cross-border activities indicates that the programme has developed a reliable operational base that supports the broader objective of enabling youth, women, and ethnic leaders to engage in democracy education and political processes.

The target did not require formal adjustment during the programme, but the definition of what constituted a “preparation activity” was refined as the operational context became clearer. At baseline, it was uncertain which steps would be feasible or necessary due to the abrupt relocation and rapidly shifting political environment. By midterm and end-term, the team focused on counting only major activities that directly contributed to sustaining operational space—such as securing a bank account and engaging potential donors—rather than the broader set of routine or adaptive measures initially captured. This refinement ensured that the indicator reflected meaningful progress toward consolidating the programme’s operational foundation.

Plans to formally register the organisation in Thailand could not proceed in 2025 due to recent changes in Thai government regulations and the high costs associated with registration.

2.2.6 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 6

<i>Young, women and ethnic leaders lobby and advocate for inclusive agendas</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of representatives (male/female) of political actors have participated in democratic values oriented training activities (e.g. democracy school)	0	<i>Dropped</i>	94 (Female – 63 Male – 31)	0



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This figure represents the total number of participants who are representatives of political actors joined learning seminars, and MDS ToT training (Female – 63, Male – 31). after removing duplicate attendees. The alumni include youth, women, and ethnic leaders from various political parties and CSOs.

The indicator was measured through consolidated attendance records from learning seminars, and MDS ToT sessions. All participant lists were reviewed, cleaned, and cross-referenced to remove overlapping names. The final end-term figure reflects unique individuals only. Participants included representatives from political parties, ethnic administrations, interim governance bodies, youth wings, and civil society actors who play active roles in political or governance-related activities.

At midterm, the indicator was formally dropped because it was no longer relevant in the evolving political context. As outlined in the updated political analysis of the 2023 annual plan narrative, severe restrictions on political participation, surveillance risks, and the criminalisation of advocacy activities made it unsafe for individuals to engage in overt lobbying or public-facing advocacy. Under these conditions, tracking participation in lobby- or advocacy-related initiatives would not have reflected the realities facing political actors in Myanmar and could have exposed participants to additional risks. By end-term, the indicator was reinstated only to document actual participation in democratic-values learning spaces—not to imply active lobbying—resulting in a final value of 94 unique political representatives trained.

The end-term value of 94 reflects the number of political representatives who were able to participate in democratic-values learning seminars and the MDS Training of Trainers (ToT) programme, rather than direct lobbying activity—which remains unsafe in Myanmar’s current context. The ToT model is particularly relevant because it equips participants with the skills to train others, communicate democratic principles, and support informed decision-making within local governance structures, including interim authorities, community committees, and township-level political networks. In a situation where formal advocacy is restricted, these locally embedded trainers play an important role in helping communities understand public-interest issues, navigate political developments, and engage more constructively with local governance actors. The value therefore reflects the programme’s ability to build a practical, decentralised training capacity that supports inclusive local decision-making, even when overt advocacy is not feasible.

The baseline value was zero because no activities could be implemented immediately after the coup, and the programme lacked safe operational channels and functioning data systems. At midterm, the indicator was dropped altogether due to the heightened risks surrounding lobbying and advocacy, which made the original indicator concept no longer appropriate or measurable. By end-term, the indicator was reinstated with a refined focus on participation in democratic-values advanced training and the MDS Training of Trainers (ToT), resulting in a value of 94 unique participants. This shift reflects both the restoration of reliable monitoring systems and the programme’s ability to deliver safe, cross-border training opportunities, even as direct advocacy remained impossible in the prevailing political context.

The difference in value shows that, although the indicator could not be used to track lobbying or public advocacy due to security risks, the programme still made progress by expanding access to democratic-values training and the MDS Training of Trainers (ToT) model. The rise to 94 participants indicates that NIMD Myanmar successfully built a broader base of individuals equipped with the knowledge and skills needed to support local governance discussions, share democratic concepts within their communities, and contribute to more informed decision-making processes at the subnational level. This reflects progress toward the programme’s objective of enabling young, women and ethnic leaders to advance inclusive agendas through safe, locally grounded channels—even when overt advocacy is not possible.

The target was initially dropped at midterm because open lobbying and advocacy became unsafe and unmeasurable in the political context described in the 2023 annual plan narrative. When the indicator was reinstated at end-term, it was adjusted to reflect participation in learning seminars and ToT activities rather than advocacy actions. This ensured the indicator aligned with what was feasible, relevant and safe for political actors under current conditions.

The actual value of 94 participants exceeds the nominal end-term target of 0, which had been set only because the indicator was dropped mid-programme. The end-term figure therefore reflects performance significantly above initial expectations and demonstrates that the programme was able to reach and train a larger cohort of political actors despite operational constraints and a highly restricted civic environment.



2.2.7 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 7

<i>Women's platforms amplify gendered perspectives on public's interest</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings (at sub-national level)	0	<i>Dropped</i>	37	0

For this indicator, “multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings” refer to diverse political and community-based discussions where youth and women alumni contribute perspectives on public-interest issues. An “inclusive process” is defined as one in which historically underrepresented groups—particularly young women—participate meaningfully by sharing analysis, facilitating dialogue, mentoring emerging leaders, or engaging in public communications. In addition, the indicator refers learning seminars/networking events organized by NIMD Myanmar. The end-term value reflects 37 instances where alumni were involved in such subnational dialogue spaces in 2024 and 2025.

The indicator was measured using alumni self-reports, activity documentation from dialogue-related initiatives, and verification by programme staff through follow-up interviews and cross-checking with event records. Only confirmed instances where alumni contributed substantively to multi-stakeholder discussions were included.

At baseline, the indicator could not be measured because no systematic data collection existed and safe participation in dialogue meetings was uncertain in the immediate aftermath of the coup. At midterm, the indicator was dropped altogether due to a lack of clarity around definitions and the risks associated with tracking participation in political dialogues. By end-term, the definition was refined to focus specifically on alumni contributions to safe, community-level or subnational dialogue settings. This allowed the team to document participation reliably while avoiding risks for alumni in highly restricted contexts.

In 2024, Six Kayin Alumni organized and participated in five multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings. They collaborated and engaged with the ERO and multi stakeholders in Kayin to advocate for the reopening of the Asia Main Road. As part of this effort, they met with the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) once, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council once, and three multi-stakeholder groups, including CSO representatives, political party members, and businesspeople. 68 people were engaged through their advocacy efforts.

In 2025, a total of 32 alumni participated in 32 multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings at subnational level to amplify diverse youth and women’s voices. They contributed through various approaches, including facilitating dialogue meetings, representing youth and women in political discussions, mentoring or coaching emerging leaders, and conducting social media campaigns or public communications. In addition, NIMD Myanmar organized 3 online learning seminar + 1 in-person MDS ToT training were organized.

The end-term value of 37 meetings should be interpreted as evidence of the programme’s ability to support safe, context-appropriate engagement by women and youth in dialogue processes at a time when formal political spaces are nearly closed. These contributions did not occur in large public forums—which remain unsafe—but in subnational, community-led, or cross-border dialogue settings where alumni could meaningfully contribute without exposing themselves to undue risk. In areas where governance structures have fragmented and local authorities, interim administrations, EAOs, and community leaders coexist, these multi-stakeholder discussions are often the only functioning platforms for addressing public-interest issues. Alumni participation therefore reflects both programme reach and the adaptability of women’s platforms in navigating a complex political landscape.

The baseline value was zero because conditions for safe dialogue participation did not exist, and data systems were not yet established. At midterm, the indicator was dropped due to definitional and safety constraints, meaning it could not be used to capture progress. By end-term, refined definitions and safer implementation modalities allowed the programme to document 37 verified alumni contributions. The increase from zero to 37 reflects both improved monitoring and the emergence of small—but significant—spaces where women and youth could bring gendered and community perspectives into political discussions.



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The difference in value demonstrates meaningful progress toward the outcome by showing that women's and youth platforms were able to insert gendered perspectives into subnational political discussions despite a highly restricted environment. While large-scale or formal advocacy remains impossible, these 37 instances indicate that alumni are applying skills gained through the programme—such as facilitation, public communication, and policy analysis—to influence local decision-making spaces. This aligns with the programme's objective to strengthen the visibility and voice of women and youth in governance processes by supporting them to operate within smaller, localised forums that remain accessible and safe.

Yes. The target was initially dropped at midterm because the indicator was not feasible to track safely under the political and security conditions at that time. When reinstated at end-term, the focus shifted from counting large-scale or formal dialogues to documenting participation in smaller, context-appropriate multi-stakeholder discussions. This adjustment reflects adaptive programme management and a realistic understanding of what types of political engagement were possible for women and youth.

The actual value of 37 meetings exceeds the nominal end-term target of 0, which had been set only because the indicator was dropped mid-programme. The final figure therefore reflects substantial progress beyond initial expectations and demonstrates that, with adapted approaches and careful monitoring, meaningful dialogue participation by women and youth was still achievable.

Conclusion

LTO2 achieved strong progress despite a highly restrictive and polarised political context. The programme exceeded its targets for training political actors, youth, and women leaders, and the results show increased confidence, participation, and influence of young, women, and ethnic leaders in subnational political processes. The percentage of women and youth who felt able to participate in decision-making rose significantly from 40% at baseline to 71% at end-term, while 145 political actors and 106 women/youth leaders were trained through democracy-oriented activities. Outcome harvesting also shows that alumni applied their learning in practice through community education, advocacy, party reform, and participation in multi-stakeholder dialogue spaces. The main achievement of this LTO is that the programme succeeded in building a wider and more capable pool of emerging political actors who are contributing to inclusive political processes through safe and locally grounded channels.

The main limitation is that direct lobbying, advocacy, and formal political participation remained highly constrained by insecurity, surveillance, and shrinking civic space, requiring the programme to adapt several indicators and implementation approaches over time.

2.3 LTO 3

2.3.1 Outcome Indicator 5

<i>Democratic political actors at the subnational level address grievances by engaging each other in dialogue. (Shan, Kayin)</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
Outcome Harvesting	<i>Ethnic political leaders are motivated to participate and are interested in</i>	<i>Democratic political actors have built trust across political divides and in</i>	<i>Democratic political actors at the subnational level address grievances by</i>	<i>Democratic political actors at the subnational level address grievances by</i>



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	<i>engaging with online resources</i>	<i>a dialogue process</i>	<i>engaging each other in dialogue</i>	<i>engaging each other in dialogue</i>
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Grievances at the subnational level are defined as current issues on the ground in the target groups' state/region which stem from deep-rooted effects of sustained conflict and are exacerbated by distrust amongst minority and majority ethnic groups.

The indicator was measured through Outcome Harvesting, beginning with a participatory outcome-harvesting workshop conducted with the full NIMD Myanmar team. The M&E focal point, together with the Country Director and Programme Manager, reviewed and analysed the harvested outcomes, triangulated them with programme documentation, and assessed progress along the actor-based pathway.

Baseline data collection occurred immediately after the coup, when access to key informants and reliable data was extremely limited. As a result, baseline values were informed estimates drawn from internal documents and the limited information available amid political volatility. By midterm, operations had stabilised in Thailand, allowing the team to conduct a structured outcome-harvesting workshop and refine definitions around grievances and dialogue engagement. By end-term, consistent facilitation of dialogue platforms and expanded engagement with subnational actors made it possible to document actual behavioural outcomes—including constitutional contributions, revisions to dialogue procedures and adoption of conflict transformation practices—rather than only anticipated changes or early signals.

The end-term outcome represents substantial, concrete progress in how democratic actors at the subnational level are using dialogue to address real grievances in a complex and fragmented political environment. In Kayin State, members of the Kayin State Dialogue Mechanism (KSDM) and the Karen/Kawthoolei State Constitution Drafting Coordination Body (KSCDCB) engaged in sustained dialogue throughout 2025, culminating in a major stakeholder meeting in Bangkok (30 April–3 May) attended by senior political leaders, including Pado Saw Hla Tun, Vice Secretary of the KNU. Dialogue members collaboratively proposed amendments to ten articles in the Bill of Rights and added six new recommendations addressing religious freedom, association, mobility, property rights and protections for women, youth, minorities, persons with disabilities and farmers. All eighteen recommendations were accepted in principle for integration into the fourth draft of the Kawthoolei State Constitution.

Dialogue actors also strengthened internal governance by revising membership procedures during their 24th meeting, reducing the approval threshold from 75 to 65 percent to broaden inclusivity. They jointly developed seven Peace Progress Indicators, using a –3 to +3 scale, to monitor local peacebuilding dynamics. These tools institutionalise learning, accountability and reflection within the dialogue platform.

In Karenni State, the Interim Executive Council (IEC) applied conflict transformation principles introduced during NIMD-supported dialogue in their departmental work. The Conflict Resolution and Mediation Training (13–14 August) enhanced institutional-level problem-solving, with fourteen out of fifteen officials recommending formal integration of training content into their departments. Subsequent Dialogue Facilitation Training (26–28 August 2025), which brought together 18 participants from Kayin and Karenni, strengthened horizontal linkages between states and improved participants' ability to manage sensitive discussions.

Taken together, these outcomes demonstrate that political actors are not merely attending dialogues—they are co-creating governance tools, shaping constitutional content, revising internal procedures and using dialogue-based approaches to address governance challenges, which is a significant achievement in the current conflict environment.

At baseline, actors expressed interest in engaging but lacked trust, credible platforms or safe mechanisms to address grievances. By midterm, political actors began building trust and jointly mapping problems, signalling readiness for deeper engagement. By end-term, actors shifted from early confidence-building to practical, repeated use of dialogue to analyse conflict drivers, revise governance procedures, coordinate across divides and contribute to constitutional processes. The progression shows increasing maturity, ownership and depth of dialogue practices.

The trajectory demonstrates strong progress toward LTO 3. Democratic actors moved from isolated, fragmented engagement to collaborative leadership in subnational dialogue processes. They applied facilitation, negotiation



and problem-solving skills to real governance issues, while dialogue structures themselves became more inclusive, structured and evidence-based. The development of constitutional recommendations, internal platform reforms and peace indicators shows that actors are using dialogue not just to talk, but to shape political solutions, aligning directly with programme objectives to strengthen inclusive, peaceful political processes at the subnational level.

With the continued deterioration of trust and security amongst political actors, LTO 3 was adjusted to make room for trust to be nurtured again while still contributing to legitimate democratic processes for the future of Myanmar. The adjustment is reflected throughout the intermediate outcomes as well as the interventions, as the pathway now engages democratic political actors from a diverse array of political and civic groups—from political actors, democracy support CSOs/NGOs, youth/women's groups—to provide them with conflict resolution and dialogue training as well as establish a multistakeholder dialogue platform.

As a narrative indicator without a numerical target, the actual end-term outcome aligns with expectations. However, the breadth and depth of the behavioural changes observed—particularly the constitutional contributions, governance reforms and cross-state collaboration—exceed what could reasonably have been anticipated at programme design, given the volatility of Myanmar's political context.

2.3.2 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 8

<i>Political parties and relevant political actors at the subnational level address grievances by reaching out to constituencies in dialogue.</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of preparation activities to create/consolidate operational space for the consortium partner/partner/country office	0	88	125	0

Same as **Intermediate Outcome Indicator 5** above

2.3.3 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 9

<i>Political parties and relevant political actors build trust to enable alliances across political divides through dialogue and mediation</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings (at sub-national level)	0	6	31	3

This indicator counts all of the dialogue meetings that have the aim of bringing political actors and civil society actors (e.g. CSO representatives, academia, religious leaders, etc) together at the subnational level (state/region). These meetings might take place under one or more dialogue initiatives.

The indicator was measured through a combination of desk reviews of agendas, participation lists, activity reports and dialogue meeting minutes, conducted by the M&E focal point. These findings were then validated with the Programme Manager and Country Director. Outcome Harvesting further contributed to consolidating evidence of collaborative engagement, especially for end-term dialogues in Kayin and Karenni. Baseline data collection occurred in the immediate aftermath of the coup, when there was minimal access to staff, informants or dialogue participants. Baseline values were therefore informed estimates based on internal documents and assumptions about what might be feasible in an unpredictable and rapidly deteriorating context. By midterm, operations had stabilised in Thailand, enabling much more accurate and timely data collection. The midterm



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value of six meetings (2021- June 2023) reflected the re-establishment of dialogue spaces and the confidence of participants in continuing to engage with NIMD Myanmar. By end-term, definitions were refined to ensure that only fully verified multi-stakeholder sessions were counted, allowing the programme to capture a more complete picture of engagement across platforms—including joint constitutional consultations and cross-state learning exchanges.

The end-term value of 31 multi-stakeholder dialogues conducted over the period (2021-2025) represents significant behavioural progress in a context of escalating conflict, governance fragmentation and collapsing national political institutions. It shows that political and civic actors were not only willing to participate but were consistently returning to structured platforms facilitated by NIMD Myanmar.

Midterm insights showed that early trust-building was already underway—Kayin actors had begun mapping root causes of conflict and engaging constructively during both online and in-person sessions. By end-term, this trust had deepened into tangible political coordination, demonstrated most clearly through the April–May 2025 joint constitutional meeting between the KSDM and KSCDCB, where actors jointly proposed eighteen amendments and recommendations to strengthen the Bill of Rights in the draft Kawthoolei State Constitution. These recommendations covered freedoms of religion, association, movement, property rights and expanded protections for women, youth, minorities, farmers and persons with disabilities.

Dialogue members also reformed their own internal procedures—reducing the membership threshold to broaden inclusion—and created Peace Progress Indicators to monitor subnational peace dynamics. Meanwhile, Karenni IEC officials applied conflict transformation tools in governance settings and strengthened departmental coordination after NIMD-facilitated mediation training. The cross-state Dialogue Facilitation Training in August 2025 further broadened political linkages between Kayin and Karenni. Taken together, the nine dialogues represent institutionalising dialogue as a governance practice, not merely a project activity.

The baseline value of 0 reflected the uncertainty and limited access immediately after the coup, when trust was fragile and it was unclear whether political actors could safely engage in dialogue. The midterm value of six marked a major shift, showing that participants were not only motivated but actively rebuilding trust through ongoing sessions facilitated by NIMD Myanmar. This demonstrated that the precondition for dialogue—restored interpersonal and institutional trust—was being met. By end-term, the increase to 31 meetings showed that dialogue was becoming more structured, frequent and cross-cutting, expanding from early trust-building to substantive engagement on constitutional content, governance procedures and conflict management across Kayin and Karenni.

The increase from zero to 31 dialogue meetings reflects remarkable progress toward this outcome. At baseline, there were concerns that only theoretical or training-based work would be possible due to mistrust and insecurity. However, by midterm, the first online dialogues revealed strong participant demand for political engagement, leading NIMD Myanmar to adapt the programme accordingly. By end-term, actors were demonstrating leadership, ownership and applied conflict transformation skills—not only attending dialogues but using them to shape constitutional provisions, improve internal governance mechanisms and strengthen cross-state cooperation. This confirms that trust-building has translated into meaningful alliances and collaborative action across political divides, representing substantial movement along the actor-based pathway.

The midterm and end-term targets remained set at 0 because they were established during a period of extreme uncertainty, when it was unclear if any dialogue meetings could safely occur. As implementation progressed and conditions allowed for expanded engagement, the relevance of the targets increased.

The programme exceeded the end-term target, achieving 31 multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings against a target of zero. This difference reflects both improved operational stability and the strong willingness of political actors to engage in facilitated dialogue when safe opportunities were made available. It also suggests that structured dialogue platforms have become increasingly relevant and effective as subnational political mechanisms in Kayin and Karenni States.

2.3.4 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 10



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<i>Political parties and relevant political actors build trust to enable alliances across political divides through dialogue and mediation</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of agreements reached (reform agendas / policies / legal amendments)	0	1	81	1

At midterm, an “agreement” was defined broadly as any commitment reached by actors within dialogue platform meetings that contributed meaningfully to the PoD programme’s objectives. This included intentions to work together (such as joint agendas or MoUs), consensus on reform priorities or jointly formulated proposals for policies or legislation. By end-term, the indicator applied this same definition but counted a wider range of agreements that emerged from more advanced and structured dialogue processes, including constitutional amendments, grievance resolutions, procedural reforms and collaborative action plans. An inclusive process refers to agreements produced through discussions involving actors from different political, ethnic, administrative and civil society backgrounds, ensuring diverse representation and joint ownership.

The indicator was measured through a desk review conducted by the NIMD Myanmar team, who examined programme documents including dialogue agendas, participant lists, constitutional drafting notes, internal reports and consolidated outputs from dialogue sessions. The Programme Manager and Country Director validated the findings to ensure that only agreements formally endorsed during multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings were counted.

At baseline, data collection took place in the immediate aftermath of the coup, when there was virtually no access to participants, staff or reliable information inside Myanmar. Baseline values were therefore informed estimates drawn from internal programme documents during a period of extreme volatility.

By midterm, data collection benefited from the re-establishment of operations from Thailand, allowing for timelier and more accurate documentation. The midterm value of one agreement reflected this improved access and the early functioning of dialogue structures.

By end-term, definitions were clearer and operational systems were stable, enabling systematic documentation of all verified agreements across Kayin and Karenni dialogue platforms. This refinement allowed the programme to capture the full scope of commitments produced through more mature dialogue and mediation practices.

The end-term value of 81 agreements represents an exceptional level of political coordination in a deeply fragmented conflict environment. These agreements show that subnational actors have moved far beyond dialogue attendance into co-authoring governance solutions, constitutional content, and political commitments.

In 2023, Kayin state political/civic leaders who attended the fourth dialogue meeting on June 13 reached an agreement on an overall operational structure for a dialogue platform in Kayin State. Later that year, 13 more agreements were reached within the dialogue process.

In 2024, 25 agreements achieved from KSDM. Due to the high political sensitivity, the agreements achieved in the first half of the year were mainly on internal agreements among and between key stakeholders who participate in the multistakeholder dialogue platform in Kayin State.

Key Details are as follows;

- 8 principles agreements (Equal rights and opportunity, non-discrimination, representation, inclusivity, legal protection, social cohesion, participation, culture and religious respect)
- 1 agreement on nomination criteria and Submission of nominee lists
- 1 agreement on selection of new members to join dialogue platform
- 1 agreement on the roles of current dialogue members and new members
- 1 agreement on prioritisation of topic, priorities, steps and issues to address for state building initiative
- 13 agreements on Bill of Rights of Kawthoolei State Constitution



In 2025, 42 agreements were reached as a result of continued dialogue meetings, including:

- Six constitutional amendments co-developed by the Kayin State Dialogue Mechanism (KSDM).
- Four jointly addressed grievances mapped and analysed by Kayin actors.
- A consensus to revise internal membership criteria (from 75% to 65%) to broaden inclusivity.
- Six Peace Progress Indicators, created by dialogue members to track peace dynamics on a –3 to +3 scale.
- Eighteen Bill of Rights recommendations produced jointly by KSDM and the Kawthoolei State Constitution Drafting Coordination Body (KSCDCB) during the landmark April–May 2025 stakeholder meeting in Bangkok, attended by senior figures including Pado Saw Hla Tun of the KNU.
- Seven cross-platform collaboration actions agreed between Kayin and constitutional actors.
- Further agreements emerging from IEC governance dialogues and conflict transformation training in Karenni States

These outcomes confirm that dialogue is functioning as a credible governance tool, not simply a convening mechanism: actors are analysing grievances, shaping constitutional drafts, refining internal procedures, designing peace-monitoring tools, and improving inter-agency coordination in ways directly relevant to emerging political arrangements.

The baseline value of zero reflected extreme uncertainty and the fragile trust environment immediately after the coup, when it was unclear whether political actors could or would participate in dialogue at all. By midterm, the single agreement reached demonstrated that target groups retained both the motivation and ability to engage, meeting the critical precondition for deeper collaboration.

By end-term, the increase to 81 agreements reflects the transition from trust-building to active collaboration. Political actors were not only participating in dialogue but using it to make collective decisions and generate concrete outputs across governance, procedural reform and constitutional development.

The increase from 0 to 1 to 81 illustrates remarkable progress toward trust-building and alliance formation across political divides. Midterm results showed that actors recognised the need for dialogue and were willing to create platform structures.

By end-term, they were engaging in joint constitutional work, forming governance procedures, developing monitoring tools, coordinating across states (Kayin–Karenni), and applying conflict transformation principles within governance institutions.

This demonstrates that multi-stakeholder dialogue has become a functional political mechanism, enabling actors to jointly address historical grievances and shape inclusive state-level political solutions.

The midterm and end-term targets were originally set at zero due to extreme political uncertainty, when it was unclear whether any agreements could realistically or safely be reached. As political actors demonstrated increasing engagement and trust-building, the target became conservative but remained in place to avoid applying numerical pressure in a sensitive political context. Adjustments were deliberately left for later planning cycles.

The actual value of 81 agreements dramatically exceeds the end-term target of 9 (and far surpasses the original zero-benchmark used during uncertainty). This shows that dialogue platforms not only survived but became productive spaces for coordinated decision-making, exceeding initial expectations by a significant margin.

2.3.5 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 11

<i>Democratic political actors understand the need for dialogue, root causes and consequences of exclusion and conflict</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
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Outcome Harvesting	0	<i>Democratic political actors understand the need for dialogue</i>	<i>Democratic political actors at the subnational level address grievances by engaging each other in dialogue</i>	<i>Democratic political actors at the subnational level address grievances by engaging each other in dialogue</i>
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For this indicator, “understanding” refers to political actors’ ability to recognise why dialogue is necessary in Myanmar’s current conflict context, how exclusion contributes to ongoing tensions and how conflict drivers intersect with governance, identity and historical grievances. An inclusive process refers to facilitated discussions where political actors reflect on conflict causes, consequences and potential responses with participation from diverse stakeholders—including ethnic political leaders, CSOs, interim authorities, youth and women—who bring different perspectives and experiences to the analysis. This indicator captures conceptual and analytical shifts, not numerical outputs.

The indicator was measured through an Outcome Harvesting exercise attended by all NIMD Myanmar staff. The M&E focal point reviewed harvested outcomes, meeting documentation and reflections from dialogue participants, then analysed the collective evidence with the Country Director and Programme Manager. This participatory process enabled the team to assess where actors were located along the actor-based pathway—moving from early understanding at midterm to applied dialogue engagement at end-term.

Baseline data collection occurred in the wake of the coup, when access to staff, political actors and reliable information inside Myanmar was nearly nonexistent. Baseline values were therefore produced through internal review of planning documents and informed estimates, reflecting extreme political volatility and the absence of safe contact with previous participants.

By midterm, operations had stabilised in Thailand, allowing the team to conduct a participatory outcome harvesting workshop. Definitions became clearer, and evidence was based on verified meeting outputs and participant reflections.

By end-term, data collection captured behavioural changes, such as grievance identification, conflict mapping, constitutional contributions and dialogue-based problem-solving across Kayin and Karenni. This reflects a shift from conceptual understanding (midterm) to practical application of dialogue principles (end-term).

At midterm, political actors repeatedly articulated the need for dialogue during six facilitated sessions and jointly developed a dynamic problem map identifying root causes of conflict in Kayin State. This reflected an important shift from passive recognition to active analytical engagement. By end-term, this understanding translated into **tangible political results**, such as:

- Kayin State Dialogue Mechanism (KSDM) members proposing amendments to 10 constitutional articles and adding 6 new rights-based recommendations for inclusion in the Bill of Rights.
- The adoption of **Peace Progress Indicators**—a –3 to +3 framework developed by actors themselves to assess peace dynamics.
- Revisions to dialogue procedures, including adjusting the membership approval threshold to increase inclusivity.
- Karenni’s Interim Executive Council (IEC) integrating conflict-transformation principles into departmental governance after training sessions.



- Cross-state learning exchanges, where Kayin and Karenni actors jointly strengthened facilitation and mediation skills.

These outcomes show that political actors now possess a deeper, structured understanding of how exclusion contributes to conflict, and they are applying this knowledge to shape governance tools, constitutional provisions and conflict-resolution mechanisms.

At baseline, no confirmed understanding could be measured due to the absence of safe engagement opportunities. Midterm results demonstrated that political actors had built enough trust to speak openly about conflict drivers, jointly identify grievances and express a shared commitment to dialogue. By end-term, this understanding had evolved into practical action, with political actors designing governance mechanisms, contributing to constitutional drafting and actively engaging in dialogue to address grievances at the subnational level.

The progression shows substantial movement along the actor-based pathway. Initial conceptual understanding has developed into consistent action: political actors are applying conflict analysis tools, using dialogue to manage tensions, contributing to inclusive constitutional drafting, and improving cross-institutional cooperation. This demonstrates strong progress toward LTO 3, as political actors are no longer merely acknowledging the importance of dialogue but are showing the capacity and willingness to use it to address exclusion and conflict.

Due to the volatile nature of political parties in Myanmar under the current context as delineated in the updated political context in the narrative, activities no longer targeted political parties and this indicator has been adapted in both the statement and indicator.

The depth of behavioural change—evidenced by constitutional contributions, peace-monitoring tools, governance reforms and cross-state collaboration—exceeds what would have been expected when planning began in an environment of extreme uncertainty.

2.3.6 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 12

<i>Political parties and relevant political actors understand and address root causes and consequences of exclusion and conflict.</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of representatives (male/female) of political actors have participated in democratic values oriented training activities (e.g. democracy schools)	0	0	59 (Female: 30, Male: 28, Other: 1)	20

This indicator captures the number of representatives of political actors—such as members of the Kayin State Dialogue Mechanism (KSDM), the Interim Executive Council (IEC) and other subnational decision-makers—who participated in training activities designed to strengthen their understanding of exclusion, conflict dynamics and dialogue-based problem solving. These training activities included sessions on dialogue facilitation, mediation and democratization. An inclusive process refers to training intentionally involving diverse actors, including women, ethnic representatives and interim authorities, who operate in fragmented governance contexts.

The indicator was measured through attendance lists from NIMD Myanmar training activities. Records were reviewed for completeness, screened for duplicates and validated by the Programme Manager and Programme Officer to ensure that the final number reflected unique individuals who participated in targeted training.

At baseline, no activities had been implemented due to the immediate political fallout of the coup, the collapse of safe channels for engagement and the lack of access to political actors. Data collection relied solely on internal planning documents and informed estimates.



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At midterm, although operational conditions had improved, the indicator was dropped because of the volatile nature of political parties in Myanmar, as described in the updated political context analysis. Political parties faced deregistration, fragmentation, surveillance and risk of reprisals, making direct engagement unsafe and strategically inappropriate. As a result, the programme no longer targeted political parties as originally planned, and the indicator could not proceed in its initial form.

By end-term, the indicator was reinterpreted to reflect engagement with political actors—such as KSDM and IEC members—rather than formal political parties. With this clarified scope, and with safe modalities established in Thailand, the programme was able to document meaningful training participation among 93 relevant actors.

30 female, 28 male and 1 other democratic political actors from KSDM and IEC members have participated in Dialogue facilitation, mediation and democratization training activities

The end-term value of 59 participants represents a significant achievement given the restricted and securitized political environment. Although political parties could no longer be targeted, subnational political actors were able to safely participate in structured learning that strengthened their ability to understand conflict drivers, analyse exclusion and engage in dialogue-based grievance handling.

These trainings were directly linked to several of the programme's major LTO 3 outcomes, such as:

- the creation of dynamic conflict problem maps in Kayin State
- the IEC's integration of conflict-transformation tools into departmental governance
- the development and adoption of Peace Progress Indicators
- improved facilitation skills used in constitutional consultations
- cross-state collaboration between Kayin and Karenni during joint facilitation training

The number therefore signifies not only completion of training but practical uptake of these skills across dialogue and governance spaces.

Baseline and midterm values remained at zero. At baseline, activities had not yet begun and safe engagement was impossible. At midterm, the indicator had been dropped because political parties—the original target group—could no longer be safely or meaningfully engaged. By end-term, with the indicator's scope adapted to include political actors operating outside formal party structures, 52 individuals were able to participate. This reflects the programme's shift from party-based engagement to actor-based, subnationally focused, conflict-sensitive programming.

The shift from zero to 59 participants demonstrates notable progress toward strengthening the capacity of political actors to understand and address exclusion and conflict. Even though the original focus on political parties had to be abandoned, the programme successfully reached the actors who were actively shaping political processes in Kayin and Karenni. Their subsequent involvement in constitutional drafting, procedural reforms, conflict mapping and cross-state dialogue shows that the training content was applied in real political settings—contributing directly to LTO 3.

Yes. The indicator was effectively dropped at midterm due to the volatile situation facing political parties, who could not be safely engaged. The target was therefore kept at zero to avoid incentivising unsafe participation. Once the scope shifted to subnational political actors, training could occur safely, but the original target remained unchanged for accountability and risk-management reasons.

The actual value of 59 exceeds the nominal target of zero, which reflects the programme's ability to adapt safely and effectively to the shifting political landscape. The difference highlights that, despite abandoning direct engagement with political parties, the programme was able to build meaningful capacity among relevant political actors who are now applying conflict-sensitive approaches within dialogue and governance spaces.

2.3.7 Intermediate Outcome Indicator 13



Myanmar

<i>Political parties and relevant political actors at the subnational level address grievances by reaching out to constituencies in dialogue</i>	Baseline value	Mid-Term value	End-Term value	End-Term target
# of representatives of civic/political actors trained in dialogue/mediation	0	13	72	20

This indicator counts the number of representatives from civic and political actors—including members of the Kayin State Dialogue Mechanism (KSDM, 18 participants), Interim Executive Council (IEC), Kawthoolei State Constitution Drafting Coordination Body (KSCDCB) and community leaders—who completed structured training on dialogue facilitation, conflict resolution and mediation. These trainings included the Conflict Resolution and Mediation Training (18 participants, primarily IEC members) and the Dialogue Facilitation Training (21 participants, including IEC, KSDM, KSCDCB and community leaders).

An inclusive process means that training brought together actors from different political, ethnic and governance backgrounds to build shared skills for engaging their constituencies, facilitating dialogue and addressing grievances in conflict-affected environments.

The indicator was measured using participant lists from KSDM members who joined the Conflict Resolution and Mediation Training (18 participants, primarily IEC officials) and the Dialogue Facilitation Training (21 participants across IEC, KSDM, KSCDCB and community networks). Attendance data were cross-checked for duplicates and validated by the Programme Manager and Country Director.

At baseline, no training activities had been implemented due to the political crisis following the coup and the absence of operational channels to safely reach political actors. Data were therefore based on internal planning assumptions rather than direct engagement.

By midterm, with operations relocated to Thailand and safe delivery modalities in place, 15 participants completed mediation and conflict-resolution training. Definitions were clearer and based on verified participant lists.

By end-term, data collection was fully systematic, and the indicator captured all unique actors trained across both major training programmes held in 2025. The broader political actor landscape—moving away from formal political parties toward interim authorities and dialogue platforms—also meant that definitions were updated to reflect who the relevant “political actors” were in practice.

The end-term value of 72 trained representatives represents a significant achievement given Myanmar’s fractured political environment. Training participants did more than complete courses—they applied their skills directly in political, governance and dialogue settings, as reflected in several key results:

In 2024, 43 participants (18 people (9 male, 9 female) from Kayin State gaining hands-on experience in dialogue and knowledge on inclusive state-building and constitutional processes based on national equality. 25 people (10 male, 14 female and 1 other) from Karenni State received in-person, skills-based training on conflict resolution and governance, held from 28 November to 1 December 2024.

In 2025:

- IEC officials in Karenni incorporated conflict-transformation tools into departmental decision-making after the June dialogue and the August Mediation Training, leading to improved coordination and accountability.
- KSDM members used facilitation skills during intense dialogue sessions, including the April–May joint constitutional consultation where 18 rights-based recommendations were produced.
- Actors from Kayin and Karenni strengthened horizontal linkages during the joint Dialogue Facilitation Training (Bangkok, 26–28 August 2025), improving their ability to manage disagreements, handle sensitive political discussions and reach consensus.
- Skills gained through training contributed to the design of the Peace Progress Indicators, adopted by Kayin actors to monitor local peace dynamics on a –3 to +3 scale.



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- Community leaders trained alongside political actors broadened the programme's constituency reach, helping connect village-level grievances to subnational dialogue structures.

Taken together, the value reflects not just expanded skills but an increased capacity to reach constituencies, facilitate discussions and address grievances in ways that contribute to subnational stability.

The baseline value of zero reflected the impossibility of delivering such training immediately after the coup.

By midterm, 13 actors had completed training—an early indicator that trust had been re-established and that safe engagement modalities were functioning.

By end-term, the number grew to 72 as dialogue in Kayin and Karenni intensified, cross-state collaboration increased, and the demand for facilitation and mediation skills rose due to growing responsibilities of interim and ethnic governance bodies.

The progression shows strong movement toward enabling political actors to address grievances through constituency engagement. Participants used new skills to facilitate constitutional discussions, mediate disputes within governance bodies, manage sensitive political dialogues, and communicate more effectively with affected communities. This reflects progress along the actor-based pathway, demonstrating that political actors have advanced from basic participation to leading and coordinating dialogue spaces, which is central to LTO 3.

Targets were not formally adjusted. Initially, uncertainty around safety and accessibility led to conservative target-setting. As conditions evolved, the programme focused on safe, high-quality engagement rather than numerical increases, which allowed participation to grow organically without applying pressure on politically exposed actors.

The actual value of 72, indicating stronger-than-expected engagement and a higher demand for dialogue and mediation training among subnational political actors.

Conclusion

LTO3 shows strong progress in strengthening dialogue-based grievance handling at the subnational level, especially in Kayin and Karenni. The programme exceeded its targets for multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings, agreements reached, and actors trained in dialogue and mediation. Political actors moved beyond trust-building to practical collaboration with key stakeholders, including constitutional recommendations, internal platform reforms, peace progress indicators, and dialogue-based problem-solving within governance structures. A key achievement is that dialogue became a functioning political tool for addressing grievances and shaping inclusive subnational solutions in a highly fragmented context at sub national level.

The main limitation is that formal political platform engagement remained highly constrained by conflict, insecurity, and shrinking civic space.

3 (Intermediate) outcome cumulative value table

LTO	Indicator	Unit	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3/midterm	Year 4	Year 5	Cumulative
LTO1	Outcome indicator: The Consortium, partner networks and local CSOs are effective enablers of change	# of proposals aimed at strengthening democratic space (jointly) formulated and	0	0	0	0	1	1



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		<i>used for L&A (at international level)</i>						
	<i>Intermediate outcome indicator:</i> <i>The PoD Consortium works complementary</i>	<i># of CSOs included in the PoD programme (other led)</i>	0	0	4	2	1	7
		<i># of consortium partners/partners/country office staff trained</i>	0	1	3	3	4	6
		<i># of civic/political actors trained in dialogue/mediation</i>	0	0	16	21	24	61
	<i>Outcome indicator:</i> <i>Young, Women and ethnic leaders are politically influential actors of change by voicing, monitoring and advocating for inclusive political agendas at the subnational level</i>	<i>% of women and youth involved in politics who feel they are able to participate in decision-making processes</i>	40%		71%		71% (29% youth, 42% women)	-
LTO2	<i>Intermediate outcome indicator:</i> <i>Young, women and ethnic leaders strengthen their political platforms by increased capacity to voice, monitor and advocate public's interest</i>	<i># of representatives (male/female) of political actors have participated in democratic values oriented training activities (e.g. democracy schools)</i>	0	43	51	49	2	145
		<i># of women/youth leaders trained</i>	0	30	40	35	1	106
		<i># of preparation activities to create/consolidate operational space for the consortium partner/</i>	10	44	44	25	2	125



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LTO3	<i>Intermediate Outcome indicator:</i> <i>Democratic political actors engage in emerging dialogue at the sub-national level (Kayin, Kayah, Mon)</i>	<i># of civic/political actors trained in dialogue/mediation</i>	0	13	15	39	5	72
		<i># of preparation activities to create/consolidate operational space for the consortium partner/partner/country office</i>	10	44	44	25	2	125
	<i>Democratic political actors have built trust across political divides</i>	<i># of multi-stakeholder dialogue meetings (at sub-national level)</i>	0	1	11	10	9	31
		<i># of agreements reached (reform agendas /policies / legal amendments)</i>	0	0	14	25	42	81
	<i>Democratic political actors understand the need for dialogue, root causes and consequences of exclusion and conflict.</i>	<i># Of representatives (male/female) of political actors have participated in democratic values oriented training activities (e.g. democracy schools</i>	0	0	15	39	5	59